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The cognitive science of holes and cast shadows
Due to their peculiar nature of ‘quasi-objects’, or ‘negative objects’ (absences with a shape), shadows and 
holes are a promising source of  insight  about  the representation of  physical  objects in cognition.   In 
philosophy, informal conceptual analysis has uncovered interesting common features. (1) Both holes and 
cast  shadows  (henceforth  ‘shadows’)  are  dependent  features;  they  cannot  exist  without  objects 
hosting/casting them. Both shadows and holes are in between being full-fledged material  objects  and 
regions of space: (2) they are similar enough to bounded regions of space, have a location, a shape, a size, 
and are as immaterial as space is, but (3) they are more object-like as they can persist over time and 
move1. 
To what extent are shadows and holes represented as object-like, and why? 
We know more about shadows than we do about holes, although shadows are just that, holes in light; for 
light makes all the difference, turning shadows into valuable sources of perceptual information as they draw 
figures  in  it.   Perceptual  representations  of  shadows  should  be  fit  for  the  particular  requirements  of 
controlled and automatic visual information processing. ; Controlled cognitive processes use shadow shapes 
and  locations  as  premises  in  inferences  whose  conclusions  describe  the  spatial  distribution  of  objects 
(shadow casters  and screens),  as  in  astronomy2,  in  x-ray analysis,  in electronic  microscopy,  in  aerial 
geological  photography.  Renaissance painters  laid  down the  foundations  of  the  mathematical  study  of 
shadows, later subsumed under projective geometry. Early investigations of the  automatic  processing of 
shadows3 capitalised  on  these  results  to  yield  shape-  and  space-from-shading/shadow  algorithms  for 
machine vision. Now, shadows do appear to be used at a very early stage in visual processing4 to extract 
distance and position, and this raises an intriguing problem: they should be labelled as shadows very early 
on (i.e.,  as transitory features,  dependent upon casters,  as opposed to permanent and independent). 
However, marks bearing little resemblance to shadows suffice for vision, and tolerance of impossible, and 
generally geometrically incongruous shadows5,6 indicates that the processing of shadows is not tuned to the 
exact norms of geometry. Much as they are informative, shadows also constitute noise as they are salient 
features of the visual scene (due to high luminance contrast at their boundary) and it takes very little to 
make them look like independent surface features – e.g. by drawing a line at their boundary (this is why 
line drawings of shadows do not work). Visual cognition eliminates this noise and provides only limited 
conscious access to shadows. 
Putting it all  together, the informativeness/noise aspect of shadows makes it reasonable for the visual 
system to extract from them useful information at a relatively early stage and then erase late access to 
shadows to prevent them from being mistaken for objects. This may explain why we are generally unable 
to detect  shadow inconsistencies unless these are pointed out explicitly;  an inconsistent or  impossible 
shadow does not look like an impossible figure as no conflict ever arose in constructing its representation. 
Finally, tolerance of incongruent shadows sits well with the idea that shadows’ representations are mainly 
position indicators (see fig. 1); this suggests that there exists an overarching perceptual representation 
genus, position indicating mark, of which shadow is a species (another species is reflection; very much like 
shadows, reflections indicate position but  the conformity of  their  shapes goes unchecked).  Illusions of 
impossible holes would be harder to construct than those of impossible shadows, as constraints dictated by 
light (uniformity of direction from a single source) do not have a counterpart in the domain of holes.
As  to  conceptual  representations,  shadows  and  holes  appear  to  be  treated  as  object-like  in  early 
development7. Infants do not find it surprising if shadows cast on an object move when the object moves; 
and they are conversely surprised when the movement of the object leaves the shadow in its place. It is as 
if shadows were patches glued to the object, thus violating condition (1) and endorsing conditions (2)-(3). 
There is evidence that holes too are treated like this, at least at a later developmental stage8; they can be 
categorized, tracked and counted, and in such tasks they are more advantaged than other non-objects such 
as parts.
The cognitive science  of  holes  is  in  its  infancy.  It  is  still  controversial  whether  topological  complexity 
(expressed by the number of holes in an object) is taken into account by perception9, little is known about 
perceptual  representations  of  holes  (are  holes  construed as  ‘negative  parts’?)  and  about  the  intuitive 
principles of classification of holes. Holes have a shape, but they are seen where a background region is 
seen and this creates a paradox, as contours are not assigned to background regions. The shape of holes 
may be perceived indirectly: the surrounding object is assigned a contour, which the hole inherits10. The 
ecological properties of holes (passages, openings) are likely to make their perceptual representations very 
different functionally from shadow representations. 
Emerging research directions/questions concerning shadows, holes, and objecthood include:
-If shadows and holes are tracked by vision, then it appears that vision does not require that full-fledged 
objects be its main target. 
-If shadows and holes are tracked as object-like in experiments using the Movable Object Target paradigm, 
then (a) at most two objects should be trackable in the presence of their shadows, and (b) holes could be 
valid distractors.
-If ‘position indicating mark’ is processed independently of geometric constraints, then it is possible to 
modify the shape of the shadow erratically without affecting the extraction of the position of a moving 
caster.  A  possible  double  dissociation  can  be  hypothesized  :  is  shape  of shadow processed  ventrally, 
whereas position from shadow is processed dorsally, disregarding the properties that could be relevant for 
establishing congruence?
- If cast shadows are an instance of ‘position indicating mark’,  then psychologically cast and attached 
shadows are  not two species of the same genus: the standard classification of cast, attached, and self-
shadows reflects pictorial practice but may not correspond to psychological natural kinds.
-To end, a methodological question. If you are a cognitive scientist working on object perception, what in 
your characterization of an object rules out that shadows and holes be treated as objects – if you think they 
should not be considered objects?
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Cast shadows keep their position indicating function in spite of being incongruous to the caster. The 
ambiguity in the position of the two cubes (top) is resolved by adding shadows (bottom): the smaller cube 
is closer to the viewer and higher up relative to the surface. 
